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Abstract 
Studies on evaluative conditioning show that a change in liking can occur whenever stimuli 
are paired. Such instances of attitude change are known to depend on the type of relation 
established between stimuli (e.g., “Bob is a friend of Mike” vs. “Bob is an enemy of Mike”). 
Research has so far only compared assimilative and contrastive relational qualifiers (e.g., 
friend vs. enemy). For the first time, we compared the effect of non-oppositional qualifiers on 
attitude change in a EC procedure (e.g., “Bob causes Positive Outcomes” vs. “Bob predicts 
Positive Outcomes”). Differential effects of non-oppositional relational qualifiers were 
observed on explicit and implicit evaluations. We discuss the implications of our findings for 
attitude research, theories of attitude change, and for optimizing evaluative conditioning for 
changing attitudes in applied settings.  
Keywords: Evaluative Conditioning, Cognitive Balance, Relational Qualifiers, Implicit 
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When People Co-occur with Good or Bad Events: Graded Effects of Relational 
Qualifiers on Evaluative Conditioning 
Whether at parties or in the supermarket, workplace, or gym, we continually 
encounter a stream of unknown individuals and are faced with the task of forming 
impressions of them. These interpersonal preferences can be formed in a variety of ways, 
from information acquired through direct contact (Hütter, Kutzner, & Fiedler, 2014), to 
observations (Castelli, De Dea, & Nesdale, 2008), instructions (Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, & De 
Houwer, 2014), or deductions (Walther, 2002). One particularly well-known pathway for 
establishing new or changing existing social attitudes is evaluative conditioning (EC). In a 
typical EC study, a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) (e.g., an unknown person) comes to be 
liked or disliked when it is paired with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US) 
(e.g., a pleasant or unpleasant image or statement). Hence, EC research can inform us about 
the conditions under which, and the ways in which, spatio-temporal co-occurences influence 
interpersonal preferences towards known and unknown groups and individuals (e.g., 
Gawronski, & Walther, 2008; Olson, & Fazio, 2006; for a meta-analysis see Hofmann, De 
Houwer, & Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). In the real-world, EC may help to explain 
a variety of phenomena relevant to person perception, from the fact that persuasive messages 
(CS) communicated by attractive individuals (positive US) are liked more than messages 
communicated by unattractive sources (negative US; Tormala & Briñol, 2015), the transfer of 
negativity from a stigmatized group to associated individuals and groups (i.e., the sins of the 
father effect; Pryor, Reeder, & Monroe, 2012), to the kill-the-messenger effect, where the 
person transmitting a message often acquires its evaluative properties (Walther, Nagengast, & 
Trasselli, 2005). 
More often than not, EC researchers have focused on the effects of mere stimulus 
pairings. Yet, in real-life, people usually encounter relational information that suggests why 
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stimuli co-occur. For instance, we might learn that, although Bob and Mike are both paired 
with positive outcomes, the former causes those outcomes whereas the latter prevents them. 
Similarly, we might learn that a work colleague is loathed by the boss or that a politican 
continually links themselves to a pro-environmental policies despite the fact that their 
behavior indicates otherwise. In each case, relational information, or information about the 
specific way in which co-occuring stimuli are related has clear implications for the evaluative 
implications of stimulus co-occurrences. 
With this in mind, a growing number of EC studies have begun to combine relational 
information with stimulus pairings and demonstrated that this information moderates the 
direction and magnitude of EC effects. For instance, Fiedler and Unkelbach (2011), paired a 
series of novel faces with one another: one face was always neutral whereas the second was 
positive or negative. Participants were told (or actively construed) that the faces were friends 
or enemies and asked, following an EC phase, to provide impressions of them. When faces 
were framed as friends, participants showed an assimilative EC effect (i.e., they liked the 
individual paired with a positive face and disliked the person paired with a negative face). 
Yet, people who related the faces as enemies showed a reversed or attenuated EC effect. 
Similarly, others have found that when people are told that a novel individual (CS) loathes 
cute kittens (US) (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2012), a fictitious creature starts a horrible noise or 
stops a good one (Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013), or that positive statements about Bob are 
invalid (Peters & Gawronski, 2011), EC effects are reversed or attenuated compared to 
situations where no such information is provided. These findings suggest that the specific 
way in which stimuli (people) are related exerts a powerful impact on the direction and 
magnitude of interpersonal preferences established via EC. These effects have been observed 
for both deliberative (i.e., explicit) and spontaneous (i.e., implicit) evaluations. Whereas 
explicit evaluations are typically assessed using questionnaires and self-report ratings, 
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implicit evaluations are captured using indirect procedures such as the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Greenwald, Mcghee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Affect Misattribution Procedure 
(Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). These latter evaluations are often emitted under 
the various conditions of automaticity (e.g., quickly and without control) and can either 
converge or diverge from their explicit counterparts, and either independently or additively 
explain future ‘downstream’ behavior in ways that explicit evaluations do not (for an 
overview see Gawronski & Payne, 2010).   
Implications of a Relational Approach to EC 
The growth in studies examining how relational information moderates EC effects has 
theoretical significance for researchers interested in EC in particular and social psychology 
more generally.  
Implications for EC. Theorising on EC has long been dominated by single-process 
associative stimulus-stimulus (S-S; e.g., Walther, Gawronski, Blank, & Langer, 2009) and 
stimulus-response (S-R) models (e.g., Sweldens, Van Osselaer, & Janiszewski, 2010). 
Changes in liking due to stimulus pairings were thought to be mediated by the automatic 
formation and activation of associative links between represents of a CS and US. However, 
the failure of such accounts to accommodate a range of findings has recently led to the 
emergence of two alternatives (see Hofmann et al., 2010, for a review). First, a single-process 
propositional perspective argues that all EC effects are mediated propositions about the CS-
US relation. Unlike associations, which have no truth-value or content, propositions specify 
the way in which stimuli are related and can therefore be true or false (De Houwer, 2009, 
2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). The second alternative is offered by dual-
process accounts which argue that EC effects can be mediated by associative and/or 
propositional processes (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). It is typically assumed that 
explicit evaluations reflect so-called propositional processes (e.g., rule-based inferences, 
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Gawronski, Brannon, & Bodenhausen, 2016) whereas implicit evaluations reflect so-called 
associative processes (e.g., spread of activation of associations formed on the basis of feature 
similarity and spatio-temporal contiguity, Gawronski et al., 2016).  
Researchers have attempted to distinguish between propositional and dual-process 
accounts by focusing on whether relational information moderates the impact of stimulus 
pairings on implicit evaluations, and in particular, whether this depends on the frequency of 
CS–US pairings (see Hu, Gawronski, & Balas, 2016). Propositional and dual process theories 
take a slightly different stance on the role that relational information plays in EC effects. 
Whereas propositional accounts argue that propositions about the CS-US relationship can 
have a direct impact on implicit evaluations (i.e., without any involvement of associative 
representations), dual-process accounts only allow for an indirect impact of propositions on 
implicit evaluations, that is, via the impact that propositions have on associations.  
The two accounts also differ in their assumptions about the role that repeated co-
occurrences play in EC effects. Studies that involve the delivery of relational information 
before (Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013), during (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2012), or after pairings 
(Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014) lead to a situation where the individual is 
confronted with two pieces of information: repeated co-occurrences and instructions or words 
that operate on, and typically reinterpret the meaning of, those co-occurrences. Propositional 
accounts might argue that co-occurrences lead to one proposition being formed and validated 
on the basis of experience (‘CS co-occurs with the US’) whereas relational qualifiers (e.g., 
the instruction that things that co-occur are opposite) generate a second proposition via 
instructions (‘CS is opposite to the US’). If the latter is considered more valid and relevant 
than the former, then CS evaluations should reflect the meaning of this reversed relation 
rather than mere co-occurrences. In contrast, dual-process accounts argue that relational 
information should moderate the impact of pairings on implicit evaluations to a much lesser 
RELATIONAL EC   5 
 
 
 
extent when the number of CS-US co-occurrences is low (e.g., 8 pairings), rather than high 
(e.g., 24 pairings). Given the assumption that CS-US co-occurrences have a direct impact on 
the strength of associations, with many CS-US co-occurrences, CS-US associations will be 
strong irrespective of the type of relational information. Hence, whenever the CS and US co-
occur frequently, implicit evaluations should reflect “unqualified co-occurrence effects 
irrespective of the manner in which the co-occurring stimuli are related” (Hu et al., 2016, 
p.19). As we will discuss below, the current study investigated the combined effects of 
relational information and CS-US co-occurrences on implicit and explicit evaluations and 
thus put these two competing accounts to the test.  
Implications beyond EC. The central idea of the current research, that propositional 
relations between a novel stimulus (e.g., a person) and a liked or disliked stimulus (e.g., a 
good or bad behavior) can influence the formation of attitudes towards the novel stimulus, is 
in-line with at two major classes of theories of social psychology: balance theories and 
attribution theories.  
Balance theories (e.g., Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Feather, 1971; Heider, 1958; 
Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997; for a review, see Crandall, Silvia, N’gbala, Tsang, & 
Dawson, 2007) suggest that attitude formation and change are guided by cognitive 
consistency principles towards a state of balance that consists of logically or affectively 
uniform impressions of others. One of the most well-known is Heider’s (1958) P-O-X model, 
where he defined balance or unbalance in terms of positive or negative relationships (denoted 
as ‘+’or ‘–’, e.g., liking and disliking) among a triad of three units: the person “P”, a 
comparison person “O”, and a third comparison unit “X” (e.g., an object, an idea, an event, or 
another person). For example, if P likes O (‘P+O’), and O likes X (‘O+X’), then the system 
of relationships among the three units will be balanced if P also likes X (‘P+X’) and 
unbalanced if P dislikes X (‘P–X’). According to Heider, attitude formation follows the 
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balance principle in that the newly formed attitude tends to be in balance with existing 
attitudes or relationships. For example, “my friend’s friend is my friend”, and “my enemy’s 
friend is my enemy”.  
One can directly apply Heider’s (1958) P-O-X model to the analysis on how sameness 
vs. opposition CS-US relationships can influence EC (e.g., Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; 
Förderer & Unkelbach, 2012; Hu et al., 2016; Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013). According to 
Heider’s model, a person (P) should like or dislike a CS (X) paired with a US (O) on the basis 
of (1) the pre-existing positive or negative relationship (i.e., liking or disliking) between the 
person and the US, and (2) the relationship (e.g., sameness, opposition) between the CS and 
the US. For example, to the extent that the person likes (‘+’) a pleasant US, the person should 
dislike (‘–’) a CS that stops (‘–’) the US, and like (‘+’) a CS that causes (‘+’) the US. This 
prediction is consistent with existing findings about how positive and negative CS-US 
relationships influence EC on both explicit attitudes (e.g., Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013) and 
implicit attitudes (e.g., Hu et al., 2016).  
While Heider’s (1958) balance theory is typically applied to the analysis of attitude 
formation and change in tradic relationships, other aspects of the balance are overlooked. For 
example, an important aspect of balance is the notion that affect (e.g., attitude) should be 
consistent with perception (see Crandall et al., 2007). Heider himself has discusssed this type 
of affect-perception consistency in his theory about attribution (Heider, 1944, 1958, 1988; 
also see Weiner, 1986, 1995). According to these theories, the effect of a piece of new 
information (e.g., Bob helps an elderly person to cross the street) on attitudes (e.g., liking of 
Bob) is modulated by the attribution of responsibility for the event (i.e., helping an elderly) to 
the focal person (i.e., Bob). According to Heider (1958), higher levels of attribution should 
result in a stronger “unit relation” between Bob and the event. The affective feeling that a 
person develops towards Bob (i.e., attitudes) on the basis of the event should be consistent 
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with the strength of the unit relation between Bob and the event. In other words, the more one 
perceives Bob as responsible for a positive event, the more the person should like Bob, 
attaining affect-perception consistency (also see Duval & Duval, 1983; Read, Vanman, & 
Miller, 1997). Surprisingly, few studies has tested these hypotheses on the effects of 
attribution on attitude formation (for exceptions, see Weiner, 1979, 1986, 1995), especially in 
the case of implicit attitudes (i.e., automatic feelings). To the extent that different relational 
qualifiers (e.g., cause vs. predict vs. unrelated) may imply various degrees of attribution of 
responsibility of US occurrence to the CS, the current research fills in the gap between the 
evidence and theories on attribution and attitude formation. 
The Current Research 
Although it is clear that relational qualifiers can moderate evaluations, and have 
implications for theorising inside and outside of EC, surprisingly little is known about 
whether certain qualifiers moderate the impact of pairings on liking to a greater or lesser 
extent than others. Prior research only compared relational qualifiers that refer to opposite 
types of relations (e.g., friend/enemy; cause/prevent; start/stop; synonym/antonym). Although 
some have argued that “EC effects depend crucially on a distinction between assimilative 
predicates (i.e., an “is similar to”–relations) and contrastive predicates (i.e., “is different 
from”–relations) employed during encoding CS-US pairings” (Unkelbach & Fiedler, 2016, 
p.415), we take a much broader position. We agree that EC effects depend on how the 
individual relates CS to US, yet, we believe that many types of relations should influence EC 
effects, even those that do not strictly involve assimilation or contrast.  
To the best of our knowledge, no study has ever compared different types of non-
oppositional qualifiers in order to determine the extent to which they moderate the impact of 
pairings on explicit and implicit evaluations. With this in mind, we conducted a pilot study to 
identify three relations that moderated the impact of statements on liking to a strong (“object 
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causes valenced event”), medium (“object predicts valenced event”), and weak (“object is 
unrelated to valenced event”) extent. We then assessed if those same relations would 
moderate the impact of stimulus pairings on liking in a similar way. Participants were first 
provided with relational information about the meaning of paired events and then 
encountered actual co-occurrences for themselves. Thereafter we administered self-report 
questionnaires as well as an indirect measure (IAT) of evaluation. Doing so allowed us to 
examine whether the same graded pattern of likes and dislikes would emerge for both explicit 
and implicit evaluations. Given that the predictions of propositional and dual-process models 
regarding the impact of relational information deviate more clearly when the number of CS-
US pairings is high, we made sure to present each CS-US pair many times. Observing an 
impact of relational information on EC would not only extend our knowledge about the role 
of relational information in EC but would also highlight the link between EC and research on 
attribution in person perception (e.g., Heider, 1958). 
Pilot Study  
We conducted an initial pilot study wherein two hundred and twelve participants (110 
men, 102 women) ranging from 17 to 72 years (M = 32.2, SD = 11.1) were presented with a 
survey consisting of 68 statements that each contained three basic elements: a generic object 
(always referred to as ‘the object’), a relational qualifier (e.g., ‘causes’), and a generic subject 
(always referred to as “positive events” or “negative events”). There were thirty-four 
different types of relational qualifiers, each paired once with ‘positive events’ and again with 
‘negative events’ (see Supplementary Materials). By holding the object and valenced event 
constant, and varying the relation between them, we examined whether, and to what extent, 
explicit evaluations of the object differed depending on the way in which stimuli were 
related. Analyses revealed that the type of relation moderated the strength of evaluative 
transfer from US to CS, both for statements that produced positive, F(33, 211) = 74.46, p < 
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.001, η2p = .26, and negative evaluations, F(32, 211) = 91.79, p < .001, η2p = .30. The vast 
majority of statements gave rise to an explicit evaluation that significantly differed from 
neutral (p < .05), and the magnitude of those ratings differed as a function of type of relation 
involved (see Supplementary Materials). Descriptively, the most extreme evaluations (both 
positive and negative) were those in which the source caused, owned, or was hierarchically 
related to the valenced event in some way. The least extreme evaluations (both positive and 
negative) were those in which the source was physically related, conditionally related, or 
unrelated to the valenced event.  
Main Experiment 
Our pilot study revealed that the specific way in which an object and valenced events 
are related influences both the direction and magnitude of attitude change. Based on these 
data, we selected three relations that moderated evaluative responding in a strong (causal, 
‘causes’), medium (predictive, ‘predicts’), and weak (unrelated, ‘is unrelated to’) manner and 
examined how the type of relation moderates EC in the context of person perception.1 We 
therefore used these relations and presented participants with a short story about two 
unknown individuals (CSs) who were said to either cause, predict, or be unrelated to the 
presence of positive or negative words (USs) in a subsequent task. Participants were then 
exposed to repeated pairings of the person’s photo and valenced words. Thereafter they 
provided self-report ratings and completed an IAT. Based on our pilot study, we expected a 
graded pattern of attitude change that depended on the type of relationship established 
between individuals and valenced events.  
Method 
                                                   
1 Analyses from the pilot study revealed that causal, predictive, and unrelated relations led to positive 
evaluations that significantly differed from one another, F(2, 211) = 440.78, p < .001, η2p = .68, as well as 
negative evaluations that significantly differed from one another, F(2, 211) = 178.39, p < .001, η2p = .46. Post-
hoc comparisons of the positive ratings indicated that ‘causal’ relations led to more extreme evaluations than 
‘predictive’ or ‘unrelated’ relations (all ps < .001), and that ‘predictive’ produced more extreme ratings than 
‘unrelated’ relations (all ps < .01). 
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Participants and design. A total of 180 English-speaking volunteers (115 men, 65 
women) ranging from 18 to 39 years (M = 28.3, SD = 5.6) participated online via the Prolific 
Academic website (https://prolific.ac) in exchange for a monetary reward (€1.50). The 
experiment was programmed in Inquisit 4.0 and hosted via Inquisit Web (Millisecond 
Software, Seattle, WA). The experiment involved a single-factor between-subjects design 
(Relation Type: causal vs. predictive vs. unrelated), with self-reported and implicit 
evaluations as the main dependent variables. Three method variables were manipulated 
between participants: evaluative task order (self-reports vs. IAT first), IAT block order 
(learning [EC] phase consistent vs. inconsistent first) and stimulus assignment (which person 
was paired with positive or negative words). The sample size was determined prior to data 
collection. We stopped data-collection whenever at least 180 participants had completed all 
measures of the experiment to ensure that we would have sufficient statistical power to detect 
medium effects even after data cleaning (necessary sample size = 154 to have power = 0.80 
to find a medium effect of η2p = 0.06 at alpha = 0.95). Note that the study designs and data-
analysis plans for the pilot and main experiment are available on the Open Science 
Framework website (https://osf.io/me9dh/). We report all manipulations and measures used in 
the study. All data were collected without intermittent data analysis. The data analytic plan, 
experimental scripts, and data are available at the above link. 
Materials          
 Stimuli. Two male faces were selected from the CAL/PAL Face Database (Minear & 
Park, 2004) to serve as CSs, based on previous studies conducted in our lab suggesting that 
they have a neutral valence. Ten positive (fantastic, wonderful, honest, kind, brave, amazing, 
nice, pleasant, selfless, great) and ten negative adjectives (horrible, nasty, violent, terrible, 
hated, disgusting, mean, unpleasant, stupid, bully) served as USs.  
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IAT. Automatic evaluative responding was measured using an IAT. Images of the 
two male faces served as one set of target stimuli and the words “Good” and “Bad” as 
another. Eight positively valenced and eight negatively valenced adjectives served as one set 
of attribute stimuli (confident, friendly, cheerful, loyal, generous, loving, funny, warm versus 
liar, cruel, evil, ignorant, manipulative, rude, selfish, disloyal) and images of the two faces 
served as the second set. 
Procedure 
Participants were first provided with a general overview of the experiment and then 
asked for their informed consent. The study consisted of four phases: stimulus pre-ratings, 
EC, evaluative measures, and exploratory questions. 
Stimulus pre-ratings. Participants were presented with the ten positive and ten 
negative adjectives one at a time on the screen and asked to indicate how positive or negative 
they considered them to be using a scale ranging from −5 (negative) to +5 (positive) with 0 as 
a neutral point. Pre-ratings of the positive (M = 3.72, SD = 0.81) and negative USs (M =  
−3.73, SD = 0.81) significantly differed from one another, t(179) = 67.79, p < .001. 
Causal instructions. Prior to the EC phase, participants in the causal, predictive, and 
unrelated conditions were each given a unique set of instructions. Those in the causal relation 
condition were given the following information:  
“In the next part of the study you will see a person and a word on the screen. The 
people you will see are actually two participants from a previous study. We gave them the 
opportunity to earn some extra money by helping us design this experiment. Specifically, 
their task was to decide what words you (and the other participants in this experiment) will 
see (i.e., they selected the words you are about to encounter). Please pay careful attention to 
the images of the two people and the words they are causing you to see”.  
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After each block of trials these instructions were repeated: “Remember: the two 
people you see during the experiment are directly responsible for the words you are seeing 
(they caused them to appear).”  
Predictive instructions. Participants in the predictive relation condition received 
different information:  
“In the next part of the study you will see a person and a word on the screen. The 
people you will see are actually two participants from a previous study. We gave them the 
opportunity to earn some extra money by helping us design this experiment. Specifically, they 
are going to help you predict what type of words you (and the other participants in this 
experiment) will see. They did not choose the words you are going to see - we (the 
experimenters) did. The images of people will simply be present onscreen so that you can 
predict what type of word will appear. Please pay careful attention to the images of the two 
people and the words they predict will occur.”  
Then after each block they were told the following: “Remember: the two people you 
see during the experiment are not responsible for the words you are seeing (we the 
experimenters are). The people you are seeing simply predict what types of words will appear 
onscreen.”  
Unrelated instructions. Participants in the unrelated relation condition were told:  
“The people you are going to see are actually two participants from a previous study. 
We are going to show you the words that they saw during their experiment. Important: we 
(the experimenters) are responsible for the words you will see in this experiment. The people 
you see are in no way related to the words (other than the fact that they [just like you] had to 
view them).”  
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Then they were reminded after each block that: “The two people you see during the 
experiment are unrelated to the words you are seeing. We, the experimenters, are responsible 
for the words that are appearing onscreen.”  
Note that in all three conditions participants could not proceed from the instruction to 
EC phase until they could accurately report the relation between the CS and US specified in 
the instructions they had received. 
EC. The EC procedure consisted of three blocks of twenty trials (60 trials total). Each 
trial simultaneously presented a neutral male face (CS) on the left and valenced adjective 
(US) on the right sides of the screen for 2500ms. During each block one of the faces (CS1) 
was presented with one of ten different positively valenced adjectives whereas the second 
face (CS2) was presented with one of ten different negative adjectives. Hence, each CS was 
paired with a US for a total of 30 trials, which is more than the number of pairings that was 
used in the high-frequency pairing conditions of earlier studies (i.e., 24 pairings in Hu et al., 
2016). The order of trials was random and the inter-trial interval was 1250ms. Assignment of 
the CSs to positive or negative USs was counterbalanced across participants.  
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported ratings were assessed using four different 
semantic differential scales. On each trial, one of the two CSs was presented and participants 
were asked to indicate their general impression of that stimulus using a scale ranging from −5 
to +5 with 0 as a neutral point. The four end-points of the scales were as follows: Negative-
Positive, Pleasant-Unpleasant, Good-Bad, I Like It-I Don’t Like It. A mean evaluative rating 
was calculated for each CS by averaging scores from these four scales. 
IAT. We assessed whether the combination of relational information and stimulus 
pairings led to a change in automatic evaluative responding using the IAT. Participants were 
informed that a series of images and words would appear one-by-one in the middle of the 
screen and that their task was to categorize those items with their respective target (Face 1 or 
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Face 2) or attribute categories (‘Good’ and ‘Bad’) as quickly and accurately as possible. They 
were told that the two individuals they had previously encountered (targets) as well as the 
words “Good” and “Bad” (attributes) would appear on the upper left and right sides of the 
screen and that stimuli could be assigned to these categories using either the left (‘E’) or right 
keys (‘I’). Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 200ms in the middle 
of the screen, followed immediately by a target or attribute stimulus. If the participant 
categorized the image or word correctly – by selecting the appropriate key for that block of 
trials – the stimulus disappeared from the screen and the next trial began. In contrast, an 
incorrect response resulted in the presentation of a red “X” which remained on-screen until 
the correct key was pressed. Overall, each participant completed seven blocks of trials. The 
first block of 20 practice trials required them to sort images of two individuals into their 
respective categories, with Face 1 assigned to the right (‘I’) key and Face 2 to the left (‘E’) 
key. On the second block of 20 practice trials, participants assigned negative words to the 
“Bad” category using the left key and positive words to the “Good” category using the right 
key. Blocks 3 and 4 (20 and 40 trials, respectively) involved a combined assignment of target 
and attribute stimuli to their respective categories. Specifically, participants categorized Face 
1 and positive words using the right key and Face 2 and negative words using the left key. 
The fifth block of 20 trials reversed the key assignments, with Face 2 now assigned to the 
right key and Face 1 to the left key. Finally, the sixth and seventh blocks (20 and 40 trials 
respectively) required participants to categorize Face 1 with negative words and Face 2 with 
positive words. Participants then completed the following exploratory questions.  
Confidence ratings. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were 
about their opinion of each of the two individuals using a scale ranging from −5 (Not 
confident at all) to +5 (Confident) with 0 (Somewhat Confident) as a mid-point. 
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Instruction memory. We assessed whether participants could recall the relation 
between the CSs and USs using the following statement: “At the beginning of the experiment 
we told you something about the relationship between the positive and negative words and 
the two men. What did we tell you?”. Participants could indicate one of the following four 
options: (a) The two men caused the positive or negative words to appear, (b) the two men 
predicted when the positive or negative words would occur, (c) the two men were unrelated 
to the words that appeared, or (d) I don't remember.  
Belief in the instructions. We assessed whether participants believed the instructions 
we provided using the following question: “To what extent did you believe us when we told 
you (at the beginning of the experiment) that the two men you saw CAUSED/PREDICTED/ 
WERE UNRELATED TO the positive and negative words that appeared in this experiment?”. 
Note that participants in the three conditions only saw the relational qualifier that applied in 
their particular case. They could respond using a scale ranging from 1 (I did not believe you 
at all) to 9 (I completely believed you) with 5 (I somewhat believed you) as a mid-point. 
Demand. Demand compliance was assessed via the following item: “Earlier we 
asked you to indicate how positive/negative you felt about the two faces. On what basis did 
you give those ratings?”. Participants could select from the following possibilities: (a) “I 
responded based on what I thought the experimenter wanted me to do”, (b) “I responded 
based on what I learned about the stimuli earlier in the experiment”, (c) “I responded based 
on my feelings about the stimuli”, or (d) “I do not know why I responded the way I did”.  
Reactance. Reactance was assessed using a two-step procedure. First, participants 
were asked “Do you think we tried to influence how you felt about the two faces?” and could 
respond either “yes” or “no”. If they selected “yes” then they were asked a follow-up 
question: “To what extent did you resist our attempts to influence how you felt?”. They could 
respond using a scale ranging from 1 (I did not resist your attempts to influence how I felt at 
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all) to 9 (I very strongly resisted your attempts to influence how I felt) with 5 (I slightly 
resisted your attempts to influence how I felt) as a mid-point. 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 To determine whether self-reported and implicit evaluations of the two face stimuli 
(dependent variables) differed as a function of the type of relation (causal, predictive, and 
unrelated) established between the faces and valenced words by the instructions and EC 
procedure (independent variables), a series of ANOVAs and post-hoc tests were carried out on 
the rating and IAT data. 
Data Preparation 
IAT. Following the recommendations of Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), 
response latency data were prepared using the D4 scoring algorithm. The resulting D4 IAT 
scores reflect the difference in mean response latency between the critical blocks divided by 
the overall variation in those latencies. The IAT score was calculated so that positive values 
reflected a response bias for the face paired with positive stimuli (i.e., CS1) relative to the 
face paired with negative stimuli (i.e., CS2) whereas negative values indicated a reverse 
pattern of responding. According to our data analysis plan, IAT data were removed for 
participants who (a) had error rates above 30% when considering all IAT blocks or above 
40% for any one of the critical IAT test blocks (7 participants; i.e., 3.9%), or (b) responded 
faster than 400 ms on more than 10% of the IAT trials (8 participants; 4.4%). This left us 
with 165 participants for analyses on the IAT data. 
Preliminary analyses. Thirteen individuals (7.2%) failed to recall the relation 
between the CS and US during the instruction memory question whereas seven (3.9%) 
reported that they were demand compliant. Including or removing these individuals did not 
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change the statistical significance of the effects reported below. As such, all participants were 
included. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Self-reported ratings. Submitting evaluative ratings to a 3 (Relation Type: Causal vs. 
Predictive vs. Unrelated) × 2 (Stimulus: CS1 vs. CS2) × 2 (Evaluative Task Order: Self-
Reports vs. IAT first) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect for Stimulus, F(1, 172) = 
226.77, p < .001, as well as two-way interactions between Stimulus and Relation Type, F(2, 
172) = 9.89, p < .001, and between Stimulus and Evaluative Task Order, F(2, 172) = 10.87, p 
< .001. Overall, participants rated CS1 positively (M = 2.19, SD = 1.95) and CS2 negatively 
(M = -1.78, SD = 2.19), t(179) = 13.77, p < .001, d = 1.03, BF1 > 105. These ratings were 
more extreme when the self-reported ratings were completed before (CS1: M = 2.69, SD = 
1.86; CS2: M = −2.39, SD = 2.12) relative to after the IAT (CS1: M = 1.56, SD = 1.88; CS2: 
M = −1.04, SD = 2.04). Critically, the extremity of self-reported ratings differed depending 
on the type of relation established between the CS and US. Planned comparisons revealed a 
bigger difference in ratings in the causal relation condition (CS1: M = 2.81, SD = 1.91; CS2: 
M = −2.53, SD = 2.12, d = 1.37) than in the unrelated relation condition (CS1: M = 1.58, SD 
= 1.90 ; CS2: M = −0.90, SD = 2.04, d = 0.70), t(117) = 4.22, p < .001, d = 0.77, BF1 = 
843.81, or the predictive relation condition (CS1: M = 2.18, SD = 1.87 ; CS2: M = −1.93, SD 
= 2.11, d = 1.11), t(118) = 1.77, p = .04, d = 0.32, BF1 = 1.51. We also observed a bigger 
difference in ratings in the predictive relation condition than in the unrelated relation 
condition, t(119) =2.49, p = .007, d = 0.46, BF1 = 6.25. CS1 and CS2 ratings differed from 
zero in the causal, predictive, and unrelated conditions (ps < .001). 
IAT. Submitting IAT scores to a 3 (Relation) × 2 (IAT Block Order: Learning [EC] 
phase Consistent vs. Inconsistent) between-subjects ANOVA revealed signficant main effects 
for Relation, F(2, 152) = 3.22, p = .04, and IAT Block Order, F(1, 152) = 18.07, p < .001. 
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Overall, the IAT scores revealed a preference for CS1 over CS2 (M = 0.28, SD = 0.40), 
t(163) = 9.00, p < .001, d = 0.70. This difference was more extreme whenever participants 
began the task in a manner that was compatible (M = 0.41, SD = 0.33) relative to 
incompatible (M = 0.15, SD = 0.40) with the stimulus pairings in the EC procedure. 
Critically, the magnitude of the IAT effect differed depending on the type of relation 
established between the CS and US. Participants who were told that the CSs caused the USs 
had higher IAT scores (M = 0.38, SD = 0.34, d = 1.12) than those who were informed that the 
CSs predicted (M = 0.24, SD = 0.39, d = 0.62), t(109) = 2.04, p = .02, d = 0.39, BF1 = 2.47, or 
were unrelated to the valenced words (M = 0.20, SD = 0.44, d = 0.47), t(107) = 2.40, p = .01, 
d = 0.46, BF1 = 5.09. Participants in the predictive relation condition did not have higher IAT 
scores than those in the unrelated relation condition, t(106) = 0.48, p = .31, d = 0.09, BF0 = 
3.27.  
Confidence ratings. A mixed ANOVA revealed an effect of Stimulus, F(1, 177) = 
15.46, p < .001, but no main or interaction effects of Relation, F(2, 177) = 0.07, p =.94. 
Overall, participants were somewhat confident in their ratings (M = 1.30, SD = 2.88) and 
more so for CS1 (M = 1.61, SD = 2.96) than for CS2 (M = 0.99, SD = 3.18). 
Belief in the instructions. A between-subjects ANOVA revealed an effect of 
Relation, F(2, 175), = 9.43, p < .001, such that participants were more inclined to believe the 
instructions when they indicated that the CS was unrelated to the US (M = 7.12, SD = 2.31) 
than when they were told the CS predicted (M = 5.46, SD = 2.69) or caused the US (M = 
5.21, SD = 2.77). Belief in the instructions was positively correlated with difference in 
evaluative ratings of CS1 and CS2 in the causal (r = 0.32, p = .01), and predictive conditions 
(r = 0.36, p = .005) and negatively correlated with those same ratings in the unrelated 
condition (r = −0.37, p = .004). Belief in the instructions only correlated (negatively) with 
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IAT scores in the predictive condition (r = −0.27, p = .05) but not in the causal (r = 0.03, p = 
.83) or unrelated conditions (r = −0.13, p = .34).  
 Reactance. A between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of Relation, F(2, 
175) = 4.62, p = .011, such that reactance was lower in the causal (M = 3.84, SD = 2.83) than 
predictive  (M = 4.72, SD = 2.76) or unrelated (M = 5.37, SD = 2.59) conditions (although 
only the difference between the causal and unrelated condition reached significance, p = 
.003). Correlational analyses revealed that higher levels of reactance were associated with 
lower magnitude of the preference for CS1 over CS2 on evaluative ratings in the causal (r = 
−0.43, p <.001), predictive, (r = −0.48, p < .001) and unrelated conditions (r = −0.30, p = 
.02), and that this was also true for IAT scores (but only for those in the causal condition: r = 
−0.32, p = .02 and not the predicitive, r = −0.08, p = .56, or unrelated conditions, r = −0.04, p 
= .78).  
General Discussion 
A growing body of work reveals that relational qualifiers (i.e., cues that specify how 
other stimuli are related) can exert a powerful influence on interpersonal preferences formed 
via spatio-temporal pairings. We examined for the first time whether certain qualifiers 
moderate these EC effects to a greater extent than others. We first conducted a pilot study 
with evaluative statements and selected three that allow for a transfer of liking in a strong 
(causal), medium (predictive), and weak (unrelated) fashion. We then investigated if those 
same relations would also moderate the impact of stimulus pairings on person perceptions. 
Results were consistent with this hypothesis: causal relations gave rise to bigger changes in 
attitudes than predictive (on both explicit and implicit measures) and unrelated relations (on 
both explicit and implicit measures), whereas predictive relations produced larger effects than 
unrelated relations (on explicit but not implicit measures).  
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Our results not only demonstrate that relational qualifiers can moderate interpersonal 
preferences formed via pairings but also raise questions as to why certain types of relations 
are more conductive than others. Although we did not have a priori predictions about which 
relations would be the most conductive (before the pilot study), in hindsight, the observed 
differences do make sense. Let us start with the fact that causal relations allow for a bigger 
transfer of valence than predictive relations. This might be related to the fact that causality 
not only denotes that a person is related to valenced events but that the former is directly 
responsible for the latter. In other words, causality is a directional (causeàeffect) relation 
that is highly reliable and unambiguous (the relation between events and responsibility for the 
valenced outcome is clear). It is also singular in the sense that only the person (and not 
someone else) is responsible for the occurrence of the valenced event. In contrast, prediction 
merely implies a temporal relation between a person and events and does not ensure that 
he/she is causally related to the valenced outcome. Although a predictive relation itself can 
also be reliable and unambiguous, the extent to which the person is causally responsible for 
the outcome is ambiguous (i.e., it could be the cause or merely a correlate). This additional 
ambiguity about the relation between object and event may be crucial in explaining the 
observed differential effect of causal and predictive relations.  
We also obtained evidence for attitude change even when participants learned that a 
person was unrelated to valenced events. An explanation in terms of manipulation failure 
seems unlikely given that participants reported that they believed (and could remember) the 
instructions provided. Another possibility is that being told or learning that a person and 
valenced outcomes are unrelated is - in some sense - ambiguous because pairing those stimuli 
does relate them in some way. In other words, repeated co-occurences could provide the basis 
for the formation of either a proposition about the CS-US relation (i.e., ‘Bob co-occurs with 
positive events’) or an association between representations of those stimuli. From a 
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propositional perspective, (some) participants might consider this experience-based 
proposition more valid than that formed on the basis of relational information (i.e. ‘Bob is 
unrelated to positive events’), which may guide their downstream evaluative judgements. 
From a dual-process perspective, high frequency co-occurrences between stimuli might lead 
to strong mental assocations that over-ride propositions formed via instructions when these 
propositions are considered invalid.   
This finding that ‘unrelated’ relations also result in changes in liking could underpin 
phenomena elsewhere in social psychology. Take the ‘kill the messenger’ effect where the 
individual (CS) delivering a message (US) acquires the valence of that message even though 
he is unrelated to the content of the message he is carrying (see also Wegner, Wenzlaff, 
Kerker, & Beattie, 1981). Or research on prejudice and stereotyping which also suggests that 
persuasive arguments can backfire when they include negations. For instance, “thinking 
about stereotyped groups or individuals in counter-stereotypical terms (e.g., “old people are 
good drivers”) is more effective in reducing unwanted stereotyping than attempts to negate 
an existing stereotype (e.g., “it is not true that old people are bad drivers”) (Gawronski, 
Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008, p.376). Hence, our results are consistent with past 
work showing that the denial of a relation creates a relation that allows for the formations of 
likes and dislikes. 
Future Directions and Implications 
The current work opens up several new directions for theorizing and research on EC 
and persuasion. It also provides concrete recommendations for optimizing attitude change in 
applied settings. 
 Theoretical implications  
EC. Our findings raise questions about single-process associative accounts which 
argue that EC effects are mediated by the automatic formation and activation of associative 
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links between a CS and US. If this were the case then explicit and implicit evaluations should 
have simply reflected the valence of the US a CS was repeated paired with, and not the 
additional information about how those stimuli are related. They also speak against dual-
process accounts given that they predict a dissociation between explicit and implicit 
evaluations, such that the former should have mainly been driven by relational information 
concerning the CS-US relation whereas the latter should have been driven by the valence of 
the US a CS was repeatedly paired with (see Hu et al., 2017; Peters & Gawronski, 2011). We 
found no evidence of this and instead observed a clear impact of relational information on 
implicit and explicit evaluations (even for high frequency CS-US repetitions).  
Our results are consistent with single-process propositional accounts arguing that EC 
effects are mediated by the formation and activation of propositions about the CS-US 
relation. Information about the CS-US relation moderated implicit and explicit evaluations in 
a manner that was consistent with the evaluative meaning of the relational information rather 
than the mere valence of the co-occurring US. Moreover, and in contrast to Hu et al. (2017) 
(but in-line with Zanon et al., 2014), we obtained such findings without the need to present 
relational information during the CS-US pairing phase. In the study of Hu et al., relational 
information only impacted implicit evaluations whenever it was presented on a trial-by-trial 
basis during EC and not when it was presented before the pairings. They argued that the 
“qualifying effects of relational information on implicit evaluations depend on the mental 
integration of co-occurrence and relational information during the encoding of CS–US 
pairings” (p.29). The current findings suggest that presenting relational information prior to 
stimulus pairings does not always lead to the independent processing of co-occurrence and 
relational information, and thus, ineffective integration of the two pieces of information 
during the encoding of CS–US pairings. Rather it can bias EC effects in a similar way to 
when such information is provided during the encoding stage.  
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Person perception. Our findings provide support to Heider’s notion of affect-
perception consistency (see Crandall, 2007), showing a graded correspondence between the 
newly formed attitude towards a target individual and the perception of relations (i.e., cause, 
predict, unrelated) between the individual and positive or negative events. These findings are 
also consistent with Heider’s (1944, 1958, 1988) theory of attribution (also see Weiner, 1986, 
1995), insofar as different relational qualifiers (i.e., cause vs. predict vs. unrelated) imply 
various degrees of attribution of responsibility of the events to the target individual. In our 
case, it may be that when the target individual caused the positive or negative events, it led to 
higher-degrees of attribution of responsibility than when the same individual merely 
predicted or was unrelated to those events. Such reasoning is in-line with Heider’s (1958, pp. 
10–11) proposal that different transitive verbs (e.g., ‘give’) can imply different types of 
causal and responsibility attributions (for related findings see Walther et al. 2011)2.  
Persuasion. Our findings are also relevant to research on persuasion. On the one hand, 
theories such as the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and the 
Elaboration-Likelihood Model (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) view the mental processes that 
mediate changes in liking due to pairings as primitive in nature. The former (HSM) would 
consider pairings as a heuristic cue (i.e., an environmental cue which elicits an information 
processing strategy based on simple rules, schemas, or prior knowledge) (e.g., pairings 
automatically elicit a rule such as “stimuli which co-occur are similar in valence”). The latter 
(ELM) typically relegates pairings to to the peripheral route of attitude change, and sees it as 
a potential input for, but rarely a type of, argument in itself (Petty & Brinol, 2014). On the 
other hand, the Unimodel of persuasion allows for “persuasive evidence to be presented in an 
                                                   
2 The current work is also relevant to literature on spontaneous trait inferences (STI) and transference (STT). 
Some authors argue that STI and STT reflect two distinct cognitive processes (STT is underpinned by 
associations whereas STI are driven by attributions; Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). Others argue that both STI 
and STT are based on simple automatic associative processes (e.g., Brown & Bassili, 2002) (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Orghian, Garcia-Marques, Uleman, & Heinke, 2015). It could be that the nature of the relation 
between people, or between a person and event or object, also moderates STI and STT effects. 
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unlimited number of forms and variations”, (Bohner, Erb, & Siebler, 2008; p.172) including 
forms that do not involve words or sentences, such as pairings (Kruglanski & Thompson, 
1999). In short, certain theories of persuasion tend to view pairings as a simple heuristic cue 
whereas others allow for the possibility that pairings could function as a persuasive argument 
(for more see De Houwer & Hughes, 2016).  
Relational EC effects, like those presented here, involve more than the mere pairing 
of stimuli. Participants are given extra verbal information about the pairings (e.g., relational 
qualifiers, instructions) and/or provided with the motivation and opportunity to think about 
the pairings in some way (e.g., make online judgements). This combination of verbal 
information and pairings (and/or requirement to effortfully think about them) may lead 
people to treat pairings, not as a heuristic cue, but rather as a ‘regularity-based argument’ 
(e.g., “the CS causes Cancer” is an argument for disliking the CS). If so, then (relational) EC 
and persuasion may have more in common than traditionally believed: both can involve 
changes in liking due to arguments but differ in the way that those arguments are delivered 
and constructed (e.g., either via stimulus pairings [EC] or words and sentences [persuasion]).  
It is also likely that relational EC (at least in the studies conducted thus far) elicits 
systematic processing (HSM) (or creates the conditions where elaboration is high; ELM), 
such that people attempt to thoroughly understand what they have been told or seen via 
careful attention, thinking, and reasoning. For instance, imagine that people see “CS Loves 
US” onscreen during the EC phase. They may carefully consider why it is that the CS loves 
the US and whether this is a good or bad reason to like or dislike the CS itself. Repeated 
presentations of this information might also provide the opportunities to elaborate on the 
argument, while pre-task instructions likely increase their motivation to do so. 
The idea of regularity-based arguments leads to several new empirical possibilities. 
First, it may be that pairings - even in the absence of extra verbal instructions or information 
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– can serve as an argument indicating that a CS is similar to a US, and as a result, leads to a 
change in liking. This is not to say that pairings always function in this regard: when 
motivation and ability to process pairings are low, it is likely that the mere fact that stimuli 
are paired does indeed function as a heuristic cue. However, increasing people’s motivation 
and opportunities to effortfully operate on the pairings, may cause them to treat pairings as a 
simple, regularity-based, argument and this argument drives their evaluations (i.e., pairings 
may function as both heuristic cue and persuasive argument). Second, regularity-based (EC) 
and persuasive arguments may differ in their respective strength, such that merely stipulating 
that a regularity exists (e.g., ‘CS co-occurs with a US’) could lead to a weaker change in 
liking than when people are explicitly given information about the evaluative properties of a 
stimulus (e.g., ‘the CS tastes good’). Third, one could manipulate the conditions known to 
influence ability and motivation to think to see if this influences the types of effects observed 
here and elsewhere in the relational EC literature (e.g., perceived relevance of the 
information, cognitive load when reading the instructions or during the EC phase). These 
questions seem like fruitful avenues for future investigation and would serve to link two areas 
in attitude research (persuasion and EC) that have rarely interacted with one another.  
Future directions. First, it is important to realise that we only focused on three 
(causal, predictive, and unrelated) relations in our main study for pragmatic purposes (i.e., to 
demonstrate that relational qualifiers differ in their capactity to moderate EC effects). Yet our 
relational survey contains many more relations that can be used by researchers to pose 
theoretical and empirical questions about EC. For instance, recent work found that under 
certain conditions, co-occurrence information can exert a stronger impact than relational 
information (e.g., Moran et al., 2016). In addition to comparing the main effects of co-
occurrences and relational information, it would be interesting to examine how both variables 
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interact, that is, the way in which the impact of co-occurrences depends on the nature of the 
relational qualifier3.  
Second, it has been argued that people also form propositonal beliefs about the way in 
which a CS and US are related even in situations where a CS and US are paired in the 
absence of additional relational information (i.e., as is the case in traditional EC studies; De 
Houwer, 2009, Mitchell et al., 2009). Our research highlights the possibility that subtle 
procedural parameters in EC studies (e.g., the particular stimuli used, as well as the ordering, 
timing, and nature of stimulus presentations) could influence beliefs about how the CS and 
US are related. It would thus be interesting to examine in future research how people 
spontaneously construct beliefs about CS-US relations, that is, even when explicit relational 
information is absent). Doing so could provide better insight into how people symbolically 
respond to regularities (such as stimulus pairings) in their environment (De Houwer & 
Hughes, 2016).  
One could also examine which aspects of the EC procedure influence beliefs about 
how CS and US are related. For instance, consider Unkelbach and Fiedler (2016) who 
recently found that by forcing people to make judgments during the EC phase (e.g., asking 
them whether they liked the CS or US more) they could alter the way in which those stimuli 
were being related (CS is better than US) without the need to introduce specific words or 
instructions (e.g., ‘better or worse than’). Such a manipulation could be interfaced with the 
relations identified in this paper to examine whether stimulus relations can be altered in more 
subtle ways, and whether the same graded pattern of evaluations would emerge if judgments 
                                                   
3 In our pilot survey causal, predictive, and unrelated relations produced strong, medium, and weak positive 
evaluations. Yet causal produced strong whereas predictive and unrelated relations produced weak changes in 
negative evaluations. Thus it seems that the impact of relational information on evaluations due to verbal 
statements may depend on the nature of the valenced events. Future work could explore whether this is also true 
for the impact of relational information on evaluations produced via regularities in the environment as well.  
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led the individual to view the object as a cause, predictor, and as unrelated to valenced 
events. 
The current research might be the first to examine the modulating effects of 
attribution of responsibility on EC effects. Although our work is limited to the context of 
person perception, it is possible that attribution plays a general role in EC, regardless of  
whether the CS is a person or a non-human stimulus (e.g., a neutral symbol). In the latter 
case, individuals who are exposed to CS-US pairings can still make attributions about the 
extent to which the CSs are responsible for the occurrence of USs. In Heider’s (1958) words, 
this type of causal attribution will lead to the perception that CS and US belong together, 
forming a unit relation. Such relation could be the key mediator for changes in liking or 
disliking of the CSs. Future research should further examine the potential role of causal 
attribution in EC. Finally, processing models have recently emerged that might help parse out 
the distinct processes that contribute to EC effects (e.g., Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, 
& Klauer, 2012). Future work could use these models to determine to what extent the effect 
of relational qualifiers on liking is driven by associative and/or propositional processes, and 
in so doing, contribute to the ongoing debate between single-process (propositional) and 
dual-process perspectives on EC (for recent work in this vein see Hütter & De Houwer, 
2017). Other work could introduce manipulations that differentially influence propositional 
and associative processes, and determine if such manipulations impact the types of findings 
reported here. In the current paper we created one such condition (high frequency CS-US co-
occurrences) that should have led to a stronger impact of associative than propositional 
processes on implicit evaluations according to dominant dual-process theories of evaluation 
(for reasons why, see Hu et al., 2016). Under this condition, however, we found evidence that 
implicit evaluations were still dependent on the type of relation between stimuli, which 
argues against such models. Future work could explore other conditions that might parse 
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between different evaluation theories. For instance, as one reviewer pointed out, the current 
study and nearly every other study examining the impact of relational qualifiers on EC effects 
have provided participants with time, resources, and the goal of attending to that relational 
information (i.e., optimised the conditions under which propositional learning is often 
assumed to operate). Thus the question remains: would the impact of relational information 
on EC effects still be evident when these conditions were undermined or removed (e.g., 
where participants are unaware of the pairings, or relational qualifiers were presented under 
cognitive load, or in an incidental fashion, as seems to be the case in the Olson & Fazio, 
2001, paradigm)? It could be that relational information only moderates EC effects when the 
individual has the motivation and opportunity to process that information during the learning 
phase (note a moderation effect might still be evident even if there is no motivation or 
opportunity during the retrieval or expression phases). When replicating this work, 
researchers could ask participants how they construed the relationship between paired stimuli. 
Doing so would provide another check to ensure that our manipulation was successful (one 
that does not depend on the evaluative measures), and additional evidence that the 
propositional relation between stimuli mattered.  
Applied implications. Finally our findings have implications for applied research on 
EC. So far, applied EC researchers have mainly relied on unqualified stimulus pairings as a 
means to promote vegetable consumption in children (e.g., Havermans & Jansen, 2007), as 
well as increased condom use (Ellis, Homish, Parks, Collins, & Kiviniemi, 2015), or 
exercising behaviors in college students (Antoniewicz & Brand, 2016). Although certainly 
effective, the addition of relational qualifiers that push evaluations in the intended direction 
(positive or negative valence) and that boost the magnitude of those evaluations might 
improve the aforementioned interventions. The current findings suggest that applied 
researchers looking to augment the effectiveness of their interventions may do so through the 
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addition of specific relational qualifiers that direct the propositions that people form about the 
CS-US relation. Although those same researchers could simply inform people about the CS-
US relation in the absence of stimulus pairings, there may be reasons why an EC approach 
might supersede verbal instructions alone. To illustrate why, imagine that a researcher wants 
to change evaluations of a novel individual and tells participants that “Bob is a good guy”. In 
some cases this may lead to reactance given that people feel coerced into liking Bob by an 
outside force. Instead, simply pairing Bob with positive images might influence their 
preferences in subtle, even irrational ways without evoking reactance (De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016). Our research suggests that researchers can boost the effects of pairings by using verbal 
or non-verbal elements that imply a specific type of relation between the stimuli. In other 
words, by learning to shape the relational beliefs that people form on the basis of stimulus 
pairings we have new tools to influence preferences in subtle but precise ways. Finally, much 
work in social and personality psychology creates relations between verbs and people (e.g., in 
vignettes) in order influence judgements and evaluations of individuals and groups. The 
current work (particularly the relational survey presented in the Supplementary Materials) 
highlights many relations that could be fed into, and refine, such protocols.  
Constraints on Generality. The current findings were obtained using an online 
sample of participants recruited from a website where site-wide demographic information 
indicates that the population is to some extent WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, 
Rich, and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). That said, given the relatively 
simple nature of the manipulation (instructions followed by stimulus pairings) we expect that 
these findings should also be replicable in the very same samples used in most evaluative 
learning research (e.g., student samples recruited in a laboratory context). Although 
antecdotal, we believe that the success of our relational manipulation is likely linked to the 
manipulation check implemented prior to (and during) the EC phase that ensured that the 
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relational information was both salient and task relevant for participants. We have no reason 
to believe that the results depend on other characteristics of the participants, materials, or 
context. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, it seems that not all qualifiers are created equal: causal relations 
influence interpersonal preferences to a greater extent than predictive relations, and predictive 
relations lead to stronger effects than unrelated relations. This finding gives rise to a more 
nuanced perspective on the role of relational information in EC, further supporting the idea 
that it is not the mere fact that stimuli are paired, but how they are paired, that determines 
implicit and explicit evaluations. The current results extend our understanding of relational 
information on EC beyond the contrastive relations explored to date, and provide data on a 
wealth of relations that have yet to be explored. They provide further support for the role of 
propositional processes in EC, and introduce two new ideas: that attributional processes 
might play a role in EC, and that stimulus pairings combined with verbal information could 
represent ‘regularity-based arguments’ that are in some respects similar to persuasive 
arguments. Thus researchers interested in using qualifiers, whether for theoretical or applied 
reasons, need not only think about the presence or absence of such qualifiers but also the 
nature of qualifier they use.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Pilot Study  
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and thirty-two English-speaking volunteers 
participated online via the Prolific Academic website (https://prolific.ac) in exchange for a 
small monetary reward (€0.75). Nineteen were excluded because they failed to complete the 
survey. One was excluded for failing to meet the minimum age criterion (17 or older). This 
left a final sample of two hundred and twelve participants (110 men, 102 women) ranging 
from 17 to 72 years (M = 32.2, SD = 11.1).4  
Materials. The survey consisted of 68 statements that each contained three basic 
elements: a generic object (always referred to as ‘the object’), a relational qualifier (e.g., 
‘causes’), and a generic subject (always referred to as “positive events” or “negative events”). 
There were thirty-four different types of relational qualifiers each of which was paired once 
with ‘positive events’ and ‘negative events’ (see Appendix). The list of relations that 
comprised the survey were generated through a brain-storming session following a literature 
search for relational qualifiers that have previously been shown to influence evaluation.  
Procedure 
Relational survey. Participants were informed that they would encounter statements 
about objects and valenced events. Their job was to indicate how much they liked or disliked 
the object in each statement. Following these instructions they then completed the survey. 
They rated all 68 statements one after the other and were asked to treat each statement as 
independent from the others. Four statements were presented onscreen at any given time – 
one above the other. The presentation order of statements was randomized across 
                                                   
4 Note that the study designs and data-analysis plans for this pilot experiment are available on the Open Science 
Framework website (https://osf.io/me9dh/). We report all manipulations and measures used in the study. All 
data were collected without intermittent data analysis. The data analytic plan, experimental scripts, and data are 
available at the above link. 
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participants, with the exception that the statement ‘the object is the same as positive/negative 
events’ always appeared at the beginning of the survey.5  
Self-reported ratings. After reading a statement, participants indicated how much 
they liked or disliked the object using a scale ranging from 1 (I dislike it extremely) to 9 
(I like it extremely) with 5 (I neither like nor dislike it) as a neutral mid-point.  
Results 
Submitting mean scores from the 34 statements that produced positive evaluations 
(see Table 1) to a repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) (with Relation Type as 
a within-subjects factor) revealed a main effect for Relation Type, F(33, 211) = 74.46, p < 
.001, η2p = .26. Likewise, submitting scores from statements that produced negative 
evaluations (see Table 2) to the ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Relation Type, F(32, 
211) = 91.79, p < .001, η2p = .30. Inspection of Tables 1 and 2 indicates that the vast majority 
of statements gave rise to an explicit evaluation that significantly differed from neutral (p < 
.05), and that the magnitude of those ratings differed as a function of type of relation 
involved. Descriptively, the most extreme evaluations (both positive and negative) were those 
in which the source caused, owned, or was hierarchically related to the valenced event in 
some way. The least extreme evaluations (both positive and negative) were those in which 
the source was physically related, conditionally related, or unrelated to the valenced event.  
Discussion 
The specific way in which an object and valenced events are related, influences both 
the direction and magnitude of object evaluations. The results are interesting as such in that 
they document important differences in how relational qualifiers moderate the impact of 
statements on changes in liking. Within the context of the present research, however, we only 
                                                   
5 We adopted this strategy in the hope that equivalence relations (“Object Same Valence Event”) might serve as 
a ‘baseline’ relation against which participants might calibrate how they respond to all other relations in the 
survey. 
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utilized these data to identify three relations that moderated the transfer of valence in a strong 
(causal, ‘causes’), medium (predictive, ‘predicts’), or weak (unrelated, ‘is unrelated to’) way 
and used these relations in our main study. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, t-test scores, and effect sizes for those CS-US relations 
from the relational survey that gave rise to positive evaluations. Items are rank ordered in 
terms of their respective effect sizes (with scores independently compared to the neutral [5] 
mid-point of the scale). 
 
Statement 
Positive Evaluation 
M SD T d  
 
1. The object causes positive events.  
 
7.83 
 
1.22 
 
t(211) = 33.77 
 
2.32 
2. I own the object and it is related to positive events.  7.67 1.23 t(211) = 31.72 2.18 
3. The object is related to positive events. 7.01 0.93 t(211) = 31.67 2.16 
4. The object is a part of positive events. 7.73 1.31 t(211) = 30.77 2.11 
5. The object starts positive events. 7.57 1.23 t(211) = 30.43 2.09 
6. The object stops negative events.  7.73 1.31 t(211) = 30.37 2.09 
7. The object is more positive than other positive events.  7.76 1.39 t(211) = 28.73 1.97 
8. The object is a member of positive events. 7.13 1.12 t(211) = 27.74 1.91 
9. The object is a type of positive events. 7.30 1.25 t(211) = 26.77 1.84 
10. The object, and only this object, predicts positive events.  7.33 1.30 t(211) = 26.09 1.79 
11. The object prevents negative events from happening.  7.61 1.53 t(211) = 24.81 1.70 
12. The object loves positive events.  7.29 1.38 t(211) = 24.15 1.66 
13. The object is an effect of positive events.  6.98 1.27 t(211) = 22.66 1.56 
14. The object is similar to positive events. 6.71 1.10 t(211) = 22.58 1.55 
15. The object predicts positive events. 6.93 1.28 t(211) = 22.00 1.51 
16. The object is the opposite of negative events. 7.16 1.48 t(211) = 21.25 1.46 
17. The object refers to positive events. 6.68 1.16 t(211) = 21.14 1.45 
18. The object is the same as positive events.  7.14 1.48 t(211) = 21.00 1.44 
19. The object occurs before positive events.  6.55 1.18 t(211) = 19.13 1.31 
20. The object (physically) approaches positive events.  6.60 1.23 t(211) = 18.94 1.30 
21. The object was previously not related to positive events but now is.  6.54 1.19 t(211) = 18.75 1.29 
22. The object is just one of many objects that predict positive events. 6.56 1.22 t(211) = 18.57 1.28 
23. Others own the object and it is related to positive events. 6.64 1.31 t(211) = 18.22 1.25 
24. The object is physically close to positive events.  6.57 1.30 t(211) = 17.56 1.21 
25. The object (physically) avoids negative events.  6.61 1.39 t(211) = 16.93 1.16 
26. The object occurs after positive events.  6.49 1.29 t(211) = 16.68 1.15 
27. The object occurs at the same time as positive events.  6.48 1.38 t(211) = 15.68 1.08 
28. The object is related to positive events only under some, but not under 
other, conditions.  
5.88 1.00 t(211) = 12.78 0.88 
29. The object is physically far away from negative events.  6.22 1.53 t(211) = 11.56 0.79 
30. The object loathes negative events.  6.30 1.72 t(211) = 10.96 0.75 
31. The object is not related to negative events.  5.93 1.29 t(211) = 10.48 0.72 
32. The object is different from negative events.  5.69 1.17 t(211) = 8.67 0.59 
33. The object is less positive than other positive events.  5.67 1.21 t(211) = 8.09 0.56 
34. The object was previously related to negative events but now is not. 5.41 1.19 t(211) = 4.96 0.34 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, t-test scores, and effect sizes for those CS-US relations 
from the relational survey that gave rise to negative evaluations. Items are rank ordered in 
terms of their respective effect sizes (with scores independently compared to the neutral [5] 
mid-point of the scale). 
 
Statement 
Negative Evaluation 
M SD t d  
1. The object causes negative events.  2.15 1.46 t(211) = 28.38 1.95 
2. The object is more negative than other negative events.  2.13 1.58 t(211) = 26.44 1.82 
3. The object is a type of negative events.  2.68 1.33 t(211) = 25.40 1.75 
4. The object stops positive events.  2.26 1.58 t(211) = 25.30 1.74 
5. The object is a member of negative events.  2.76 1.29 t(211) = 25.13 1.73 
6. The object starts negative events.  2.32 1.57 t(211) = 24.85 1.71 
7. The object prevents positive events from happening.  2.36 1.65 t(211) = 23.22 1.59 
8. The object is the same as negative events.  2.81 1.49 t(211) = 21.39 1.47 
9. The object is the opposite of positive events.  2.75 1.61 t(211) = 20.37 1.39 
10. The object is similar to negative events.  3.29 1.22 t(211) = 20.32 1.39 
11. The object loves negative events.  2.54 1.79 t(211) = 20.01 1.37 
12. The object is a part of negative events.  3.01 1.46 t(211) = 19.85 1.36 
13. The object is related to negative events.  3.17 1.43 t(211) = 18.69 1.28 
14. The object loathes positive events.  2.75 1.77 t(211) = 18.44 1.27 
15. Others own the object and it is related to negative events.  3.09 1.59 t(211) = 18.29 1.26 
16. The object is an effect of negative events.  3.31 1.36 t(211) = 18.11 1.24 
17. I own the object and it is related to negative events.  3.09 1.59 t(211) = 17.46 1.19 
18. The object was previously not related to negative events but now is.  3.37 1.42 t(211) = 16.65 1.14 
19. The object is physically close to negative events.  3.42 1.42 t(211) = 16.15 1.11 
20. The object refers to negative events.  3.63 1.42 t(211) = 14.07 0.97 
21. The object occurs after negative events.  3.73 1.45 t(211) = 12.71 0.87 
22. The object (physically) approaches negative events.  3.74 1.51 t(211) = 12.16 0.84 
23. The object occurs before negative events.  3.69 1.57 t(211) = 12.15 0.84 
24. The object occurs at the same time as negative events.  3.70 1.61 t(211) = 11.72 0.81 
25. The object (physically) avoids positive events.  3.60 1.75 t(211) = 11.61 0.79 
26. The object is related to negative events only under some, but not other, 
conditions.  
4.24 1.10 t(211) = 10.02 0.69 
27. The object is physically far away from positive events.  4.04 1.55 t(211) = 9.07 0.62 
28. The object is less negative than other negative events.  4.29 1.16 t(211) = 8.98 0.62 
29. The object is not related to positive events.  4.42 1.37 t(211) = 6.24 0.43 
30. The object was previously related to positive events but now is not.  4.46 1.46 t(211) = 5.36 0.37 
31. The object is different from positive events.  4.65 1.34 t(211) = 3.86 0.27 
32. The object is just one of many objects that predict negative events.  4.90 1.73 t(211) = 0.84 0.06 
33. The object, and only this object, predicts negative events.  4.94 2.23 t(211) = 0.37 0.03 
 
